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Therapeutic Approach in 




This study aims to critically assess the so-
called therapeutic approach in moral education, 
which emerged in the postwar twentieth century, 
in the western part of the world. The proponents 
of the approach used different terms to express its 
essence: value clarification method, or sometimes 
the decision-making method or the critical thinking 
method. These philosophies of education have the 
common feature of a personalistic, non-directive, 
or client-oriented approach to the individual. 
Therefore, I will refer to them here as therapeutic. 
There are many advocates, but some of the most 
notable should be named: Carl Rodgers, Jean 
Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Sidney B. Simon, 
Louis Raths, and Merrill Harmin. For a proper 
understanding of these approaches, it’s necessary 
to review first the cultural-ideological context of 
their origin. After that I will analyze and evalu-
ate their key tenets, which I consider problem-
atic. Specifically, we will scrutinize these prob-
lems: (1) the problem of process at the expense 
of content, (2) the problem of devaluation of the 
educator’s authority, (3) the problem of blurring 
of moral concepts and standards, (4) the problem 
of value pseudo-neutrality and indoctrination, 
(5) the problem of individualism, subjectivism, 
and relativism.
Key words:
Moral, education, therapeutic, method, in-
doctrination.
Historical and cultural context 
Education, in the sense of therapeutic clarifi-
cation of values (and all related concepts), was in 
many ways a reaction to the postwar crisis of val-
ues and culture in general. The coming genera-
tion openly distanced themselves from the “mor-
als” of their parents. In addition to freedom of 
expression, emancipation of human rights, and 
emphasis on autonomy, the prevailing sentiment 
of the flower children was resistance towards the 
“stale” culture that priggishly preached, commis-
sioned, and taught. The culture of their fathers—
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the sick woman, borrowed from everyone he 
could and still had only half of the cost of the 
medicine. He begged the pharmacist to lower 
the price or allow him to pay it in install-
ments. But the pharmacist wouldn’t budge. 
Desperate, Heinz broke into the pharmacy at 
night and stole the medicine. 
Sharon and Jill were best friends. One day 
they went shopping together. Jill was trying 
on a sweater, when she suddenly put her jacket 
on over it and left the store. The guard arrived 
immediately afterwards, stopped Sharon and 
asked the name of her friend who had fled the 
store. At the same time, she threatened to call 
the police if Sharon wouldn’t give the name. 
The questions for discussion are obvious: Was 
Heinz’s theft wrong or not? Should Sharon be-
tray her friend or not? The discussion has to be 
well-controlled didactically in order to fulfill its 
task. Therefore, the authors present the follow-
ing instructions. (1) Recapitulate the basic facts 
of the story and ask a clear yes/no question. (2) 
Give the students enough time to think through 
the question and answer independently, ideally 
in writing, and with justification. (3) Next, the 
students say their answers aloud. If it happens 
that most of the group agree, S. B. Simon rec-
ommends adding “balancing” information. For 
example, if most of the class vote for giving the 
name, the teacher can draw attention to the im-
plications that this judgment would have on the 
girls’ friendship, or bring a new variable into the 
story—for example, what if Jill was from a weak 
social background, and so on. (4) The teacher is 
to lead the discussion in a fundamentally non-di-
rective manner. No interfering unless necessary, 
only steering it by means of questions—either 
stimulating (if the discussion lags), or regulatory 
(if the discussion gets off track) or clarifying (to 
break down concepts or motives, etc.). Teachers 
must also avoid the temptation to express their 
own opinions (even though the students request 
it) because that usually ends the discussion. (5) 
The conclusion of the discussion should contain 
a summary of the arguments (for and against), 
as well as a re-stating of the beginning and end-
ing opinions. Did the students change their view? 
because of the horrors of war that were still fresh 
in their memories—had lost its moral legitimacy 
and become more of a source of shame than 
something to pass along pedagogically. From 
such a background it was not surprising, there-
fore, that in the 1960s there arose a method that 
emphasized discussion, openness, engagement, 
no guidelines, and so on. The goal of the method 
was neither the formation nor transmission of 
any kind of specific “bag of virtues,” in the words 
of Lawrence Kohlberg, or other moral material; it 
was indoctrination, which was considered one of 
the cardinal defects of all traditional educational 
approaches.1 Teachers and educators of this new 
type were given the task of helping students 
think independently and critically, based on the 
psychological assumption that if the individuals 
themselves identified their own values, the in-
ternalization of those values would be easier and 
more durable than if they were mediated by some 
adult. The students were thus guided to discover, 
classify, and develop their own values, that is, to 
construct their own moral universe.
Experimental findings by developmental 
psychologists such as Piaget and Kohlberg con-
veniently arrived just in time.2 Although their 
theories of the moral and cognitive development 
of the individual were not originally intended to 
be educational, their application to pedagogy was 
soon found. Different variations of Kohlberg’s fa-
mous micro-story dilemmas were used in lessons 
as a tool for clarifying moral categories and val-
ues, a tool which was expected to both move the 
students to a higher stage of moral development 
and teach them independent moral judgment 
and argumentation. 
How does the method work in didactic prac-
tice? For illustration, I present two mini-stories: 
Kohlberg’s now famous “Heinz’s Dilemma” and 
“Sharon’s Dilemma” from the just-as-well-known 
teacher’s handbook of Simon and his colleagues:3
A fatally ill woman lived in Europe. She suf-
fered from a special kind of cancer. There ex-
isted a medicine that was recently discovered 
by a pharmacist from the same town. To pro-
duce the medicine was very expensive, and 
the pharmacist charged ten times more than 
it cost him to make. Heinz, the husband of 
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For what reason? And so on. Of course, the sto-
ries and strategies can also be subject to thematic 
changes and adapted to the age and circumstanc-
es of the group. 
The method spread quickly and gained popu-
larity. In addition to Simon’s handbook, which 
became a bestseller, many other similar textbooks 
were published. By the 1980s, however, the first 
problems and criticisms had appeared. I will not 
here critique Kohlberg’s 
theory as a diagnostic tool 
for identifying stages of 
moral development (oth-
ers have already done that), 
but rather I will present a 
critique of the didactic ap-
plication.
Critics admit that this 
method brought about 
some contribution to the moral educational dis-
cussion. If it is used prudently, that is, with sen-
sitively chosen topics appropriate to the age and 
maturity of the children, circumstances, etc., this 
method can help make them sensitive to moral 
reality, sometimes even bringing them to a first 
“awakening” —from, for example, the typical 
adolescent egocentrism, or even narcissism. From 
the viewpoint of the content of the selected top-
ics, this method proved to be very attractive, 
especially in the critical teen years—what ado-
lescent isn’t interested in topics like sex, drugs, re-
lationships, murders, or cannibalism (eating the 
last survivor of a shipwreck on a deserted island). 
Non-directive and group strategies entertain, en-
gage, or activate and thus motivate and stimulate 
students—all results that are seen as the greatest 
didactic currency of this approach. But the criti-
cism is massive.4 
Process at the Expense of Content 
This therapeutic approach to moral educa-
tion suffers, above all, from the “subordination of 
content for the benefit of the process,” says James 
Hunter: The presentation of certain moral con-
tent (content-based instruction) is secondary and 
completely overshadowed by questions about 
the “process whereby morality is acquired.”5 The 
ideological source of this approach is the anthro-
pological assumption of the innate goodness of 
human nature, the belief that people are unprob-
lematically good—both ontologically and mor-
ally. In the 20th century we first saw this domi-
nance of process over content in Carl Rogers’ 
personalistic concept of client-centered therapy. 
Rogers says that people should accept themselves 
as “streams of becoming” in a life-long process 
of self-actualization. Fully actualized individuals 
would then see themselves 
as a “fluid process, not a 
fixed and static entity […], 
a continually changing 
constellation of potenti-
alities, not a fixed quan-
tity of traits.”6 Later Rogers 
explicitly states that the 
process of self-realization 
applies to education as 
much as to therapy. “The teacher,” says Rogers, 
“becomes a facilitator in the process of the stu-
dents’ self-definition […], a resource-finder […]”. 
He would want the quality of his relationship to 
the group to be such that his feelings could be 
freely available to them, without being imposed 
on them or becoming a restrictive influence on 
them.”7 
This emphasis was enthusiastically corrobo-
rated by many educators. William Glasser, for ex-
ample, in his book School Without Failure, bluntly 
condemns education aimed at specific moral 
content as preaching: “We teach mindless confor-
mity to school rules and call the conforming child 
‘responsible.’”8 Simon, Howe, and Kirshenbaum 
speak in a similarly unequivocal way when they 
say that contents of a traditional curriculum are 
“out-dated, moralistic” and strive after the “in-
culcation of adult values into the youth,” and as 
such are “indoctrination.” They, in contrast, seek 
a higher goal, “the facilitation of the process of 
moral judgment.”9 The same appeal comes from 
the constructivist camp. A school that would pres-
ent any kind of “objective morality” is compared 
to an “army camp,” and the teachers to “drill ser-
geants.” Proper education should consist of draw-
ing out values only “as the need arises,” say Rheta 
DeVries and Betty Zan. They continue, “we are 
talking here about a process and not a product. In 
Education, in the sense of 
therapeutic clarification of 
values (and all related concepts), 
was in many ways a reaction to 
the postwar crisis of values and 
culture in general.
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this process, children wrestle with questions, what 
to believe to be good and bad, right and wrong. 
They form their own opinions and listen, listen 
to the opinions of others. They construct their 
own morality out of daily life experiences.”10 The 
last thing a teacher should do is to “dictate moral 
norms to the children.”11 Instead, a teacher should 
“cooperate with the children by trying to under-
stand their reasoning and facilitating the construc-
tive process.”12 
However understandable the resistance to tra-
ditional moral content is, and however welcome 
the appeal for a helpful pedagogical climate, the 
unilateral emphasis on the procedural side of 
moral formation has had the effect over time of 
emptying the contents of moral education as such. 
The logic of the problem is simple: If the teacher 
only therapeutically “recognizes, accepts and vali-
dates”13 students’ moral feelings and perceptions 
without resorting to criticism (because it would 
improperly interfere with the students’ process 
of self-actualization), it’s inevitable that sooner or 
later the teacher will agree with a completely im-
moral construction on the side of the student, a re-
sult which has also been confirmed in pedagogical 
practice. Thomas Lickona recalls, from his clinical 
research, the experience of a 9th- grade teacher who, 
within the framework of ethical education, used 
the technique of “voting on values.” The teacher 
began the discussion with the question “Who of 
you has ever stolen something from a store?” Most 
of the students raised their hands. “Don’t you 
think that stealing is bad?” Lickona comments 
that the teacher forgot for a moment that such a 
question violates the rule of value neutrality. “We 
have a right to material things,” answered one of 
the students, and the others nodded in agreement. 
The teacher remained clueless.14 
In addition to similar narrative testimonies, 
there are many empirical studies that unsurpris-
ingly support the idea that the suppression of the 
content of education leads logically to its empty-
ing of content, and ultimately to its malfunction-
ing.15 If the individual is not exposed to moral 
content, there is nothing to develop; moral devel-
opment simply does not appear. 
Devaluation of the Authority of the Educator
The imperative of therapeutic non-instruc-
tion is not only a matter of the teachers’ didactic 
manner or conduct in the classroom; it basical-
ly concerns their social role. Proponents of the 
methods described above encourage educators 
to programmatically abdicate their traditional 
role as ones who instruct, interpret, and present 
moral content. We have seen a shift in the under-
standing of their role—teachers should act as fa-
cilitators or consultants, sometimes as assistants. 
They still have the responsibility of organizing 
classroom activities and academic discipline, but 
the way of accomplishing it is different under the 
therapeutic conception. In 1963 Jean Piaget said 
that the “imposition of the authority” of an adult 
is, in an educational context, “absurd” and “im-
moral.” In his judgment, an adult should only be 
an “elder collaborator and, if he has it in him, a 
simple comrade” to children.16 
The same philosophy applied in Kohlberg’s 
experimental community (Just Community)—
“students and teachers participate equally in the 
creation and enforcement of rules.”17 Parents are 
also encouraged to take the same approach: “To 
achieve [the] parental goal of raising responsible 
children who grow into responsible men and 
women, parent-child relationships need to be 
based on democratic principles […] of mutual 
respect and equality.”18 To this, James Hunter 
observes that the term “democracy” is used here, 
but it is losing its specific historical meaning. The 
original—Greek—usage of the term expressed 
a way of organizing the political life of a soci-
ety where the roles and relational responsibili-
ties between the people (démos) and those who 
lead them, were defined in a concrete way. But 
educational therapeuticians use the term democ-
racy without that context, and here it describes 
the process of social organization without any 
further identification. Thus, it becomes a code 
or charm legitimizing the right of individuals to 
participate and make decisions in any context.19 
The consequences are predictable. The estab-
lished structure of pedagogical authority loses its 
social significance. 
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Blurring of Concepts and Standards 
The growing reluctance to convey any kind 
of moral content, however objective, accompa-
nied by the phenomenon of weakened teacher 
authority to safeguard the content, had the effect 
of eroding moral terminology and, ultimately, 
moral standards as such. As in theory, so in prac-
tice, the normative distinctions for seeing and 
clarifying good from evil were lost. The concepts 
of good and evil, right and wrong, did not com-
pletely disappear, but they 
were redefined, a result 
that caused a fatal confu-
sion of terminology and 
was a source of misunder-
standing. 
When, for example, 
Kohlberg talks about mo-
rality or immorality, these 
are always relative terms, defined according to 
the level of moral judgment the individuals are 
capable of using in this or that period of their 
development. So as people evolve and become 
more “moral,” their morality is not the same as 
becoming good. For example, if selfishness or 
other character flaws appear in the judgment or 
behavior of individuals, these are considered the 
result of developmental or cognitive immaturity, 
or general inadequacy in their cognitive func-
tionality.20 Thus, the concept of good and evil has 
lost its ontological status, and with that also its 
objective meaning, and gradually also its mean-
ingful referential framework in language, a loss 
that Alasdair MacIntyre very aptly pointed out.21 
In the therapeutic context, the concepts of 
good and evil have slowly become outdated and 
incorrect, precisely because they have lost their 
ability to relate to anything that would be con-
sidered as moral reality. Adam Philips notes 
that the therapeutic approaches have literally 
developed a “phobia” to the word evil.22 I have 
personally observed a similar fate for the word 
guilt. The fact that there is a pathological form 
of this “emotion” has led to its stigmatization 
and the subsequent neglect of its healthy form. 
At the same time, the psychological strength of 
guilt is, in terms of healthy moral development, 
irreplaceable. It has the “power” to save people 
from their tendency towards wrong behavior and 
also to motivate them towards correction, when a 
wrong has been committed. But this potential is 
dependent on a shared consensus on the concepts 
of good and evil. By eliminating it, educators and 
therapists have made the concept of guilt power-
less and forbidden. The guilty one needs therapy, 
not punishment. 
Hunter adds that neologisms such as the 
word prosocial are an unconcealed attempt to 
avoid the encumbrance of 
the old moral categories.23 
In principle, the meaning 
remains the same—so-
cially positive or negative 
behavior matches with the 
statement “what you did 
is good/bad,” but the hard 
emotional tip of the con-
cepts is broken off, and in addition the teachers 
are enabled to distance themselves from termi-
nology that sounds judging or condemning. This 
phenomenon is well illustrated by the fact that 
the frequent use of the term prosocial didn’t used 
to be contrasted in literature with the word evil, 
nor with antisocial. Rather, it was contrasted with 
the somewhat amorphous word negative, in dis-
cussions about the deficiencies of pro-socialism, 
but never to talk about evil.
If the moral concepts still appear in linguistic 
usage, they do so only as categories of meaning 
that individuals construct on the basis of their 
experience. Teachers, then, have the task of en-
couraging students in that construction of moral 
reality, for example, by programmatically creat-
ing the opportunity for students to vote on rules 
for classroom behavior or the values that will be-
come the code of the group. But what happens 
when the students—in their predictable inven-
tion and creativity—vote, say, that someone who 
doesn’t cheat is a “chicken” or maybe that they 
don’t wish to do certain school activities that re-
quire effort, such as grammar lessons or PE, on 
the grounds that these activities don’t belong to 
their value system? 
The obfuscation of moral language is also 
evidenced by pedagogical practice based on the 
therapeutic approach. Critics point out that 
If the individual is not exposed 
to moral content, there is 
nothing to develop; moral 
development simply does 
not appear.
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the fundamental misgivings and dangers of the 
method of moral dilemmas consist in their im-
plicit relativization of moral principles. If stu-
dents are programmatically exposed to unsolv-
able moral situations, they can get the impression 
that all morality is “unsolvable,” i.e., problematic, 
controversial, and ultimately relative. Students 
who are confronted with one extreme situation 
after another in which it isn’t clear whether they 
should steal, lie, kill, or eat each other, in the end 
become convinced that concepts such as good 
and evil are completely vague—evidence of a 
very sophisticated form of indoctrination because 
it is carried out on a latent level.24 But is the start-
ing point of the premise of this approach correct? 
Is it possible to apply conclusions derived from 
extreme situations to non-extreme situations? 
From abnormal to normal? From exceptional to 
common? Let us consider the example of Heinz’s 
dilemma. In a life and death situation, stealing 
seems acceptable, even moral. What would it 
be for a person who puts morals (not stealing) 
above human life? Does it follow from these ex-
tremes that stealing is permissible—even under 
ordinary (or all) circumstances? The answer is 
obvious (at least I hope so). And I believe that 
neither Kohlberg nor any other supporters of the 
critical method would agree with a conclusion of 
unrestrained robbery. Nevertheless, the method 
of moral dilemmas really leads to such a conclu-
sion, even if the teacher is not aware of it. 
Kilpatrick25 wonders how a dilemma about 
theft could help young teenagers overcome the 
temptation to steal money from their parent’s 
wallet. He says that most of the moral situa-
tions faced by both children and adults are not 
dilemmas: most moral choices are unambiguous. 
We simply have to do what we know we should 
do, and not do what we know we shouldn’t. 
The time spent in school would be much bet-
ter used by considering (and practicing) virtues 
such as friendship, loyalty, and honesty rather 
than focusing on unsolvable situations where 
truthfulness seems wrong, friendship is separated 
from honesty, and cannibalism is legitimized. 
Kilpatrick further notes that the method of di-
lemmas, especially when applied to children at 
an early stage of moral and cognitive develop-
ment, is “woefully inadequate,” because it comes 
out of the assumption that children already have 
the “ABCs of morality,” and are therefore able to 
cope with questions requiring a higher level of 
moral judgment.26 In other words, Kilpatrick is 
arguing that before children are exposed to moral 
complexity (remember Sharon: “Is it right to be 
loyal to a friend, or truthful to the authorities?”), 
they should be taught the basics of morality (“Is 
it right to steal this sweater?”). If that doesn’t hap-
pen, the youth are put into moral confusion be-
cause they are instilled with the preconceptions 
that (a) suppress the basic moral intuition that 
some things are really and unproblematically 
good and some bad; and (b) lead to a contradic-
tion between moral theory and moral practice. 
However possible it is to instill and hold the the-
ory of the relativity of moral norms, it cannot be 
meaningfully applied in practice. We start teach-
ing children from the time they’re in the sand-
box that there are some things they cannot do to 
others, and we say the same thing to criminals 
in court. 
Value Pseudo-neutrality and Indoctrination
Critics of therapeutic pedagogy point to the 
fact that, in spite of their claim that the thera-
peutic approach is completely value-neutral, the 
reality is the opposite. Kilpatrick presents an ex-
ample of a favorite didactic strategy, “VV,” which 
is Value Voting.27 The exercise begins with in-
nocent questions like “How many of you like to 
go for walks in the countryside?” or How many 
of you love picnics?” or “How many of you love 
yogurt?” But soon there appear questions like 
“How many of you approve of premarital sex?” 
or “Which of you are for legalizing abortion?” or 
“How many of you are in favor of having homo-
sexual couples married by priests, ministers, and 
rabbis?” Kilpatrick points out that the authors of 
the method have made no effort to separate the 
heavy-value questions from the light ones. They 
are intertwined as though there were no signifi-
cant differences between them. The exercise is de-
signed to give young people the impression that 
“all values are questions of personal taste—as in 
the case of yogurt,” says Kilpatrick. This kind of 
design is not only not neutral, it is “indoctrinat-
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ing” because it deliberately and somewhat de-
ceitfully instills the doctrine of value relativity. 
Whether or not it is the teachers’ intention, if this 
method is used in pedagogical practice, it does 
indoctrinate (although students/teachers usually 
are not even aware of it). 
Proponents of the therapeutic method un-
derstandably don’t like to be associated with 
such a—for them almost vulgar—word and 
vehemently defend them-
selves.28 Indeed, resistance 
to indoctrination was one 
of the central motives of 
the alternative approach. 
But the problem is that 
they defined the term in-
doctrination very vaguely. 
It didn’t occur to them that 
they also held a set of spe-
cific values and doctrines 
that they perforce communicated to children 
by whatever indirect method. Once the term is 
defined, it becomes clear that their approach ful-
fills every criteria of indoctrination. The defini-
tion of Downey and Kelley, to which Kohlberg 
referred in one of his apologies, is an illustration 
of the problem. The triad of indoctrinating crite-
ria—questionable content, questionable method, 
questionable goals—is so general that even its 
proponents fall into it. They communicate noto-
riously questionable content or doctrine—values 
are relative. They use questionable methods—the 
therapeutists’ preferred non-directive methods of 
teaching. Non-directiveness, however, doesn’t 
guarantee anything. Teachers may (and often 
do) indoctrinate in a non-directive way. That 
is, in effect, an effective trick. Intentional? asks 
Kilpatrick.29 I won’t be as mistrustful as my col-
league here. I use the adjective “effective” as op-
posed to “intentional” because I am not presum-
ing that there is any premeditated or manipula-
tive intent. On the basis of my own pedagogical 
experience and personal interaction with fellow 
teachers, I have come to the conclusion that few 
teachers actually seek to relativize moral values 
on the part of their students. Rather, I think that 
users of the therapeutic method simply haven’t 
anticipated the implications of their theory. There 
is nothing more practical than good theory. If, 
however, the theory is dubious, the practical con-
sequences will be dubious too, even though the 
way is lined with good intentions.
Not only the teacher but also the student is 
outwitted here. They were promised a tool to 
“stimulate” moral thinking, which would lead 
to greater moral competence, but in reality they 
were subjected to the process of methodological 
relativization of values. It 
is woven into the thera-
peutic textbooks, not in a 
neutral way but skillfully 
(and probably uninten-
tionally) hidden. Despite 
the rhetoric of value neu-
trality that it proclaims in 
theory, practice shows that 
the therapeutic educator is 
anything but neutral. 
Individualism, Subjectivism, Relativism
In light of what has been said, it is unsurpris-
ing that therapeutic pedagogy has earned accu-
sations of moral subjectivism, accompanied by 
individualism and eventually leading to moral 
relativism. Conservative theoreticians and prac-
ticioners of education have been thoroughly 
heard from in this respect. See, for example, 
Kilpatrick’s bestseller, Why Johny Can’t Tell Right 
From Wrong, first published in 1992. In the title, 
the author makes a deliberate reference to the 
earlier book by Rudolf Flesch, Why Johny Can’t 
Read. In it, Flesch clarifies the reason for the fail-
ure of certain didactic experiments carried out in 
America in the postwar years. Briefly, the tradi-
tional phonetic method of language teaching was 
replaced by the “look-say” method, in which the 
focus of reading acquisition was transferred from 
teachers to students. The authors of the project 
promised greater engagement of students, which 
would lead to more effective acquisition of read-
ing skills. The reality was just the opposite, and 
the project was a total failure, but before it end-
ed (for a certain time it had the approval of the 
federal authorities), it produced a whole genera-
tion of nearly illiterate “readers.” Kilpatrick says 
that something similar happened in the area of 
In the therapeutic context, the 
concepts of good and evil have 
slowly become outdated and 
incorrect, precisely because 
they have lost their ability to 
relate to anything that would 
be considered as moral reality.
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moral education. In his judgment, the dramatic 
decline in moral literacy, which can not only be 
documented statistically but also seen with the 
naked eye, is the consequence of implementing a 
bad method. A whole generation of children have 
been fooled by its moral relativism and are now 
unable to recognize the good from the bad. 
Proponents of therapeutic pedagogy defend 
themselves against the accusation of relativism. 
They say that their method “definitely promotes 
the values of thinking, feeling, choosing, com-
municating, and acting” as well as “rationality, 
justice, creativity, autonomy, and equality.”30 Alfie 
Kohn denounces the “rampant individualism and 
self-assurance” that threaten society as a whole 
and argues for “community cooperation” as a key 
goal of moral education.31 Abraham Maslow sim-
ilarly explains that “valuelessness” is the “greatest 
disease of our time.”32 The term democracy also of-
ten appears as a non-negotiable value that should 
be promoted by moral or civic education. (There 
is even a subject called Education to Democracy 
or Democratic Thinking—as opposed to totali-
tarian thinking). The same goes with respect, tol-
erance, empathy, and the so-called Golden Rule. 
So, no relativism?33  
It is good, however, to ask all these sets of 
values these questions: Where are they coming 
from? On what ontological basis do they stand? 
How are they anchored or validated? One way 
to avoid meta-ethical problems is simply to as-
sert that they are values of the type of univer-
sal maxims or ideals that are self-validating or 
self-evident, and that no further justification is 
needed. But such an evasive maneuver doesn’t 
work in education. From the earliest age, chil-
dren are wired in such a way as to need to know 
the reasons for their actions, or the actions re-
quired of them. The instruction “you should” do 
this or that, or behave in this way or that, calls 
forth a child-like natural and unaffected desire 
to know why. It’s true that there are “why” ques-
tions and developmental stages that really don’t 
need an answer, such as “Why shouldn’t I touch 
the burner?” But others literally cry out for an 
answer: “Why should I be brave?” “Why must I 
control myself?”
Most educators know this fact very well; and 
therefore, if possible, they look for good answers 
or fundamentals, which would give meaningful 
justification for moral values and rights—includ-
ing therapeutic educators. But on what basis? 
Moral ideals are rooted “neither in the conven-
tions of social life or public discourse, nor in an 
external or transcendent standard inherited from 
any particular moral tradition,” explains Hunter; 
and, he continues, “rather, these ideals are rooted 
in the rights (the desires, feelings, needs and po-
tentialities) of the autonomous individual. The 
self, in brief, is both the source of all moral sen-
sibility and the final object of moral accountabil-
ity.”34 Rodgers can in many ways be considered 
the father of this concept:
The individual increasingly comes to feel that 
the locus of evaluation lies within himself. 
Less and less does he look to others for ap-
proval or disapproval; for the standards to live 
by; for decisions and choices. He recognizes 
that it rests within himself to choose; that the 
only questions that matters is “Am I living 
in a way that is deeply satisfying to me, and 
which truly expresses me?”35 
Elsewhere he adds,
Everyone possesses the capacity to expand, ex-
tend, become autonomous, develop, mature. 
[Moral capacity] exists in every individual 
and awaits only the proper conditions to be 
released and expressed. [...] Whether one calls 
it a growth tendency, a drive toward self-ac-
tualization, or a forward-moving directional 
tendency, it is the main-spring of life.36 
In psychotherapeutic circles, Maslow speaks 
similarly about people. Everyone has an “inner 
core,” which “as much as we know of it so far, is 
definitely not ‘evil,’ but is either what we adults in 
our culture call ‘good’ or else it is neutral,” he ex-
plains.37 “Self-realization” and “self-fulfillment” 
are, in his judgment, “instinctive.” Let Maslow 
speak more extensively about human nature: 
Man demonstrates in his own nature a pres-
sure towards fuller and fuller Being, more 
and more perfect actualization of his human-
ness in exactly the same naturalistic, scientific 
sense that an acorn may be said to be “pressing 
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toward” being an oak tree, or a tiger can be 
observed to “push toward” being tigerish, or a 
horse toward being equine. Man is ultimate-
ly not molded or shaped into humanness or 
taught to be human. The role of the environ-
ment is ultimately to permit him or help him 
to actualize his own potentialities.38 
Fathers of liberal education like Rousseau 
would have rejoiced: no molding, no teaching, per-
mission, letting the potential itself be actualized… 
What potential? “Creativeness, spontaneity, self-
hood, authenticity, caring 
for others, being able to 
love, yearning for truth are 
embryonic potentialities 
belonging to his species-
membership just as much 
as are his arm and legs and 
brain and eyes.”39 
The therapeutic educational concepts are, 
in their theory, true echoes of this anthropol-
ogy. Again and again we read that “learning is 
a process whereby meaning, ethical or other-
wise, must be actively invented and reinvented, 
from the inside out.”40 Or, write other authors, 
“The individual who is autonomously moral fol-
lows moral rules of the self. Such rules are self-
constructed, self-regulating principles”41 —hence 
the didactic emphasis on autonomous decision-
making and choice, which are so characteristic of 
this kind of education. True values “represent the 
free and thoughtful choice of intelligent humans 
interacting with complex and changing environ-
ments.”42 But the values must be chosen freely, 
else they’re not “right”; or, at least, they are “cho-
sen from among alternatives,” but mainly, “after 
independent consideration.” The imperative for 
free choice has become so inviolable that educa-
tors have been encouraged to “help the children 
look for value, as long as [emphasis mine] the chil-
dren make the decisions. It is also possible that 
the children decide not to develop values. The 
teachers’ responsibility is to support even such 
a decision.” 43 Kohn adds pregnantly, “children 
must be invited to reflect on complex issues, to 
recast them in the light of their own experience 
and questions, to figure out for themselves—and 
with one another—what kind of person one 
ought to be.”44 In other words, a value can be-
come one’s own only through choice. 
Pedocentrism of this type necessarily leads 
to moral subjectivism and relativism, as is well 
illustrated by the handbook of one of the thera-
peutic education programs with the title Growing 
up Caring. Let’s consider two examples. In the 
chapter on cheating in school, a student discov-
ers a picture of a girl during an exam looking 
over the shoulder of her classmate, with the ac-
companying text: “Cheating, in any form, is 
bad for your self-esteem.” 
In another chapter in the 
book is a photograph of a 
young girl who is stealing 
from a store, while the next 
picture shows two other 
people watching her and 
recording it on camera. 
The accompanying text says, “One way to test 
the impact a decision will have on your feeling of 
self-worth is to imagine a picture being taken of 
you implementing your decision.”45 The ethical 
argument of these instructions is clear—the chil-
dren are not led to believe that cheating or steal-
ing are objectively wrong because they violate a 
universal law. Cheating is wrong because it calls 
forth an unpleasant feeling or threatens the self-
confidence of an individual. Such an argument is 
almost amusing to someone who grew up under 
a totalitarian regime in the seventies and eight-
ies. In a culture deformed by Communist ideol-
ogy, people felt downright happy if they could 
manage to steal from the state-owned property, 
or at least get around some law. After all, the best 
people—from a moral perspective—were usually 
“illegal” or in prison or exile. Things are different 
now in both the East and the West. The “feeling” 
argument no longer works today—the number of 
individuals whose self-esteem would be lowered 
by being exposed as a person who committed an 
unethical act is rapidly declining everywhere.
Subjectivism, which is behind the therapeu-
tic concepts of pedagogy, has a direct connection 
with the “cultures” of ethical utilitarianism and 
emotivism (sometimes called expressionism). In 
utilitarianism, moral discourse determines the 
logic of expediency and usefulness; in emotion-
A whole generation of children 
have been fooled by its moral 
relativism and are now unable 
to recognize the good from 
the bad.
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alism, the logic of psychological well-being. In 
both cases, it is the individual I who arbitrates 
moral prudence. In this frame of reference, the 
most important moral act is that of choice, mak-
ing a decision—not a decision for something, just 
making a decision, period, and deciding it your-
self—Jean Paul Sartre in pedagogical robes. 
The results? Therapeutic pedagogies have 
achieved their goals; and in doing so, they have 
become part of the problem they wanted to solve. 
The therapeutically raised generation is truly au-
tonomous, at least to the extent that they have 
ruled out any commitment that would go be-
yond the borders of subjective choice and personal 
well-being. It is the logical result of programmatic 
questioning of objective moral reality. If I am be-
ing convinced that the final arbiter of moral val-
ues is me or my feelings, eventually I will believe 
it. If I am methodically urged to self-identify my 
existence through free choice, I will eventually do 
it. Who would have expected that, entirely freely, 
I would choose evil? But it could have been ex-
pected—at least since Zimbardo and Milgram.46 
But before them, Dostoyevsky already said it; and 
before him, Aquinas, Augustine, Paul of Tarsus, 
and many others.
In Place of Conclusion: The Abolition of Man 
Many of the problems of the therapeu-
tic approach were uniquely dealt with by C. S. 
Lewis in his book The Abolition of Man, sub-
titled Reflections on education with special refer-
ence to the teaching of English in the upper forms 
of schools. Lewis’s treatise crosses lines not only 
in its form—concise, intense, brief, and all with 
typical Lewis readability—but most of all in that 
Lewis almost prophetically predicted the moral 
problems that came later. Most observers or crit-
ics—including those I refer to here—normally 
analyze the results of some phenomenon, but 
Lewis, with unprecedented foresight, presented a 
description of what was yet to come. Therefore, 
he deserves special attention in the conclusion of 
this paper. 
The text of the book is based on three lec-
tures Lewis gave in 1943.47 Lewis is reacting to 
a textbook on the English language which—so 
it wouldn’t offend anyone—was hidden under 
the designation “green book” by the pseudony-
mous authors “Gaius and Titus.” It was a book 
written in 1939 called The Control of Language: A 
Critical Approach to Reading and Writing, by Alex 
King and Martin Ketley. Lewis analyzes the way 
in which the authors of the textbook subvert the 
students’ values—not only the moral ones. When 
a value statement is made, such as “that waterfall 
is beautiful,” the authors teach that it is only the 
subjective statement of a specific feeling on the 
part of the observer, not a statement about objec-
tive reality. We think we’re saying something im-
portant about something real, but we are actually 
only saying something about our own feelings, 
claim the authors. Lewis argues that such sub-
jectivism in value judgments is flawed because 
some subjects and some acts are actually real; 
that is, they are objective and deserve an evalu-
ation, whether positive or negative. A waterfall is 
objectively beautiful, a villain is objectively evil. 
Understandably, an ethics which doesn’t believe 
in the reality of objective moral values will avoid 
the concepts of good and evil. But if we replace 
“good” with predicates like “necessary,” “progres-
sive,” or “impressive,” we are using just a trick of 
language, a linguistic ruse, says Lewis, who ex-
plains with the questions “necessary for what? 
progressing towards what? effecting what? In the 
last resort they [Gaius and Titus] would have to 
admit that some state of affairs was in their opin-
ion good for its own sake.” In other words—it 
is good to call things by their right names and 
cultivate an “ethics without predicates.” 
According to Lewis, this ethics has been well 
taught by good teachers from time immemorial. 
Lewis reminds us of the thinkers of antiquity 
such as Plato, Aristotle and Augustine, who, in 
one way or another, cultivated “ordinate affec-
tions,” that is, teaching people to love that which 
ought to be loved and to hate that which ought to 
be hated—to love good and hate evil. Although 
moral feelings and values are real, they don’t de-
velop automatically in people, says Lewis. Hence 
the need for education. Those who don’t have 
these moral capacities are lacking the very thing 
that would make them specifically human. They 
would be, in Lewis’s words, “men without chests” 
or “without hearts.” The Gaius and Titus book 
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produces such people by undermining the fact 
that people are capable of contact with objec-
tive reality (moral, aesthetic or other) and thus 
taking away from them that which is humanely 
the most valuable. (If such people were asked, 
“Do you think there is something real outside 
of you—truth, goodness, beauty, the noumena?” 
they would answer, “No—there’s only you, the 
subject, your impression, 
phenomena, illusion.”) 
What will happen with 
the human world when we 
explain away and thus do-
mesticate moral reality? In 
the last part of his book, 
Lewis gives an unbeliev-
ably accurate sketch of the 
contours of the modern 
dystopia that should soon 
emerge if this demoralizing trend were tp con-
tinue. The power of human beings to do exactly 
what they wish will grow with the so-called “con-
quest of nature,” that is, the development of the 
natural sciences. However, every new power ac-
quired by Man is, at the same time, “power over 
man,” says Lewis. Therefore, it is good to ask 
whose power grows with every further sublima-
tion of nature. Lewis predicts that if the dream of 
some scientists becomes a reality and we humans 
“take control of nature,” it will mean the suprem-
acy of hundreds of people over billions of others. 
The final stage of conquest will be conquest of 
one’s self, that is, human nature. Human nature 
will be the final bastion of the natural world that 
will be conquered. The victorious ruling minor-
ity will become a caste of Conditioners, that 
is, people who will have control tools (he men-
tions eugenetics, genetics and psychology) and 
who will knead, form, and cut out the nature of 
the succeeding generations however they want: 
“The process which, if not checked, will abol-
ish Man goes on apace among Communists and 
Democrats no less than among Fascists,” warns 
Lewis, I remind the reader, in  1943. He adds, 
“The methods may (at first) differ in brutality. 
[…] The belief that we can invent ideologies at 
pleasure, and the consequent treatment of man-
kind as mere specimens, preparations, begins 
to affect our very language.” 48 Man’s conquest 
of Nature turns out to be Nature’s conquest of 
Man. Man’s power over everything destroys him.
Lewis called the process of conquering, when 
people sacrifice one thing after another, and fi-
nally even themselves, in order to gain power 
over nature and human nature, a “magician’s 
bargain.” Faust’s metaphor illustrates the fact 
that modern “science” has 
the same goal as the an-
cient magic, which is the 
submission of reality to the 
wishes of humankind—to 
command the wind and 
the rain, to gain that hid-
eous strength,49 which is in 
fact to become a god. To 
achieve their goal, they use 
magic and science to do 
things that have long been considered “disgust-
ing and impious.” 
The same applies to moral values and princi-
ples. If they are conquered, people will have the 
power to freely modify, design, and even produce 
them. Moral values and ethics are not things 
that determine a person, but things that persons 
themselves determine however they see fit, a situ-
ation that means the end of them. And this is the 
“tragi-comedy of our situation,” Lewis concludes: 
we call loudly for precisely those qualities that we 
ourselves have subverted: “In a sort of ghastly sim-
plicity we remove the organ and demand the func-
tion. We make men without chests and expect of 
them virtue and enterprise. We laugh at honor and 
are shocked to find traitors in our midst. We cas-
trate and bid the geldings be fruitful.”50
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